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Abstract The threat of credit card fraud is arguably one of the most serious issues in
e-commerce, since it makes consumers reluctant to engage in this alternative
method of shopping. Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) was invented to
address this issue, and it provides effective security for the entire Internet e-
commerce transaction. However, SET has not really taken off; implementation
issues appear to be the main factor restricting its adoption. Given the existing
consumer concerns about e-commerce security, SET still appears to be very rel-
evant to the Internet e-commerce transaction environment. The integration of
SET with EMV is a possible route for facilitating the wider use of SET in Inter-
net commerce transactions, since it could simplify user registration. The aim of
this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of SET/EMV integration for fraud re-
duction in e-commerce. In addition, this paper also considers the implementation
feasibility of SET/EMV.
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Infrastructure (PKI), digital certificate, digital signature.
1. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of e-commerce provides consumers with an alternative method
of payment via the Internet. E-commerce both offers new opportunities for sales
and also potentially reduces the time spent in traditional shopping methods [22].
For example, there is no need for consumers to visit retail premises in order to
purchase goods. However, this non face-to-face shopping method also permits
fraudsters to take advantage of the lack of card and cardholder authentication
to perform illegal operations, such as use of credit card numbers without the
consent of the valid cardholder. This issue makes consumers reluctant to pur-
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2chase goods online by credit card and hence restricts the size of the e-commerce
market.
According to Treese and Stewart [20], the credit card is the most common
method of payment in business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. In addition, a
survey of Internet users conducted by Survey.Net1 indicates that more than 50%
of Internet users purchase products or services by credit card. Therefore, it is
inevitable that the secrecy of credit card numbers is a serious issue of concern to
Internet purchasers. Many potential consumers are afraid to submit their credit
card numbers via the Internet and also perceive Internet shopping as the riskiest
method [10].
Several tools and techniques have been used to address consumer fears, such
as the IETF’s SSL-based Transport Layer Security (TLS) [14] and SET [13].
SET is arguably the most secure method of online payment by credit card,
since it provides consumer, merchant and card issuer with protection for the
entire transaction. However, SET has not been widely adopted, at least partly
because of implementation issues. As a consequence, extensions have been
proposed to SET to address some of these implementation problems. One such
set of extensions to SET are the ‘chipcard extensions’ [16], which enable EMV-
compliant debit/credit cards to interoperate with the SET protocol, thereby
simplifying the end-user initialisation process. We refer to this combination
of SET with EMV as SET/EMV. The intention of this paper is to evaluate the
effectiveness of SET/EMV in B2C e-commerce.
2. OVERVIEW OF SET/EMV
2.1. SET — background and technical overview
SET was invented by Visa2 and MasterCard3, and was designed to address
security threats arising to both transmitted and stored data [18]. SET employs
both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography to protect purchasing information
sent among SET participants. Key management for SET is based on the use of
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [2] to reliably distribute public keys between
SET participants [15].
SET requires the e-consumer to have been through an initialisation process,
which involves:
the generation of an asymmetric key pair for the e-consumer;
the (reliable) transfer of the e-consumer public key to the e-consumer’s
bank (an issuer), which generates a public key certificate for the e-
consumer using its own private signature key;
the (reliable) transfer of the system ‘root’ public key to the e-consumer,
along with the e-consumer’s public key certificate;
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the e-consumer’s private key is stored in a ‘digital wallet’ on the e-
consumer’s PC, which will typically be password protected.
Recently, several SET extensions have been introduced in order to facilitate
greater adoption and use of SET, including the PIN and chip extensions.
2.2. EMV — background and technical overview
The EMV Specifications (named after the three responsible organisations:
Europay, MasterCard and Visa International), [6], [9], [17], define how com-
pliant IC cards and payment terminals should interact. These specifications
were agreed to enable IC cards to be used to replace existing credit and debit
magnetic strip cards, without requiring a separate merchant terminal for each
card brand. Like SET, EMV employs a PKI mechanism to support the provi-
sion of confidentiality and integrity for transactions. EMV has two distinct card
authentication methods [7]: static and dynamic authentication; in this paper we
restrict our attention to EMV cards that support dynamic authentication since
not only is it more secure but it also offers better integration with SET. The
PKI underlying the EMV dynamic authentication scheme operates as follows.
An outline of the underlying PKI is also given in Figure 1.
The root certification authority certifies a card issuing bank’s public key
and passes this public key certificate back to the issuing bank. In this case,
the root CA is operated by the card brand (e.g. Europay/MasterCard).
When creating an EMV card (supporting dynamic authentication), the
card issuer generates a signature key pair for the card. The card issuer
then signs a public key certificate for the card, using the card issuer’s
private signature key. The following three items are loaded into the card:
the card’s own private key, the certificate for the card public key, signed
by the card issuer, and the certificate for the card issuer’s public key,
signed by the root (brand) CA.
The public key of the root (brand) CA is distributed to the acquiring bank,
who ensures that it is present in every merchant terminal.
The presence of the brand CA public key in the merchant terminal enables
the terminal to verify the two certificates in an EMV card, and hence
verify the card’s public key. This supports digital signature-based card
authentication to the terminal during an EMV transaction.
2.3. The integration of SET with EMV
The integration of SET with EMV is feasible, since the two systems share a
number of features.
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Figure 1. The PKI supporting EMV dynamic authentication [7].
Credit card fraud reduction Both SET and EMV were devised to try and
reduce credit card fraud, albeit for rather different types of transaction,
namely remote (e-commerce) transactions and ‘in person’ transactions at
merchant premises, respectively.
Use of PKI As discussed above, SET and EMV are both based on the use of a
hierarchical PKI in which brands sign public key certificates for banks,
and banks sign public key certificates for end users.
PIN entry and verification SET requires a cardholder to enter a PIN as part
of the cardholder verification process before initiating an e-commerce
transaction. Similarly, EMV requires a cardholder to verify themselves
via a PIN entry process at an EMV-compliant merchant terminal.
3. SET/EMV PROCESS IN E-COMMERCE
TRANSACTIONS
We next sketch the main steps in a SET/EMV transaction [5]. The transaction
process is outlined in Figure 2, and in the text below we refer to the numbered
steps marked in the figure.
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Step 1 The consumer and merchant exchange a SET initiation message. At
this stage, the merchant invokes the cardholder system and informs the
consumer of the payment brands accepted.
Steps 2 and 3 A cardholder selects the payment card to be used to initiate a
SET/EMV transaction. Then, the cardholder system selects an applica-
tion from the card. In some cases, additional input from the cardholder
may be required.
Steps 4 and 5 The cardholder system initiates the card application and reads
the application data from the card. This process will involve communica-
tion between the EMV card and the reader to verify the consumer credit
card information stored in the EMV card.
Steps 6 and 7 The consumer requests a purchase initialisation. The merchant
then responds to the consumer request. The cardholder system will in-
form the merchant server of the payment method, and the merchant server
responds with the information relevant to purchase completion.
Step 8 The Cardholder System retrieves authentication information from the
cardholder, e.g. a PIN, and either presents it to the card or transmits it to
the card issuer for verification.
Step 9 At this point the Cardholder System may request the card to initiate an
online authorisation of the transaction. The card has the option of either
declining the transaction offline, or requesting an online authorisation.
Step 10 The Cardholder System now requests a purchase, and provides the
Merchant Server with the data that it, the Payment Gateway, and the card
issuer require to be able to respond to the request.
Steps 11 and 12 The merchant passes an authorisation request to the acquirer
via the payment gateway. The acquirer forwards an authorisation request
to the consumer bank (issuer) through the banking payment network.
Steps 13 and 14 The issuer returns a payment authorisation to the merchant
via the acquirer.
Step 15 The Merchant passes a purchase response to the consumer for a con-
firmation of purchase.
Step 16 The Cardholder System communicates with the card to terminate the
transaction process.
Steps 17 and 18 The merchant requests the acquirer to capture the transaction.
The acquirer responds to the merchant request.
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Figure 2. The SET/EMV transaction process [5].
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4. SET/EMV IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
We next evaluate the effectiveness of SET/EMV integration for fraud reduc-
tion in e-commerce and also consider what makes SET/EMV different from
traditional SET.
There is no significant difference between SET/EMV and the traditional SET
scheme as far as credit card fraud reduction is concerned, since most SET/EMV
processes are the same as the traditional SET scheme. However, there is a
significant difference in practice, since traditional SET requires a cardholder
to register for a public key certificate prior to engaging in any transactions. A
cardholder then needs to perform PIN entry to activate a private key stored at
his/her computer in order to initiate SET. Some problems with traditional SET
implementations are as follows [11].
The cardholder may not be able to participate in SET, since the process
of public key registration is one of major factors restricting the adoption
of SET [12].
The cardholder’s private key is at risk of compromise if third parties can
access the cardholder PC.
The cardholder must use his/her own computer in order to initiate SET.
SET/EMV avoids these issues by making use of the key pair present in an
EMV card, thus avoiding the need for initial registration and reducing the risk
of key compromise.
4.1. Benefit analysis
SET/EMV is likely to be beneficial to both consumers and merchants in e-
commerce transactions since it prevents most conceivable types of credit card
fraud. In particular, the consumer can be confident that:
There is no means for an interceptor to steal or disclose consumer financial
information when SET/EMV is employed.
The merchant is legitimate and unable to access or modify the payment
information, since the merchant is certified by an acquirer and the pay-
ment information is signed using the consumer private key and encrypted
using the acquirer public key.
Sensitive cardholder information, including the cardholder private key, is
stored in the consumer’s EMV card and is thus protected by the smartcard
physical security features.
Although credit card companies will typically reimburse consumers in the
event of a disputed transaction, this insurance does not cover the merchant for
8e-commerce transactions. The merchant is generally responsible for card-not-
present costs associated with fraudulent transactions [20], [3]. The benefits that
e-merchants receive from the use of SET/EMV include the following.
The merchant can be confident that the cardholder is genuine, since the
cardholder must input their PIN to the card via their PC and card reader.
Merchants pay nothing for disputed card-not-present transactions, since
SET scheme transactions are regarded in the same way as face-to-face
traditional transactions.
Merchants know that nobody can access consumer order information,
including the acquirer, thus retaining merchant privacy.
4.2. Potential barriers
As already mentioned, SET/EMV can remove the complexity of end-user
initialisation, a significant barrier to the use of traditional SET [11]. However,
one factor remains that can restrict the implementation of SET/EMV, namely
the cost of implementation.
According to Donnelly [4, p.9], ‘E-tailers don’t want to spend the money
because they are already spending more money on credit card transactions than
traditional retailers’. Similarly, e-consumers are likely to be reluctant to buy
extra PC peripherals, e.g. a card reader, just to perform e-commerce transactions.
Other potential issues with traditional SET are its low transaction speed, and
novel e-payment infrastructure. We now analyse the potential effect of all these
criticisms on SET/EMV in more detail.
4.2.1 Transaction speed. The speed of transactions is an important
factor, since this can make e-commerce end-users reluctant to use SET/EMV.
According to Whinnett [21, p. 449], ‘Insufficient speed also discourages on-
line shopping and creates the danger that users will interrupt transactions if they
are not implemented quickly enough’.
In traditional SET implementations, in order to achieve the necessary trans-
action throughput at the merchant server, SET may need support from special
hardware devices, such as cryptographic accelerators. An alternative to de-
ploying special hardware is to select public key cryptosystems which minimise
computational workload, e.g. elliptic curve cryptosystems [8].
SET/EMV suffers from very similar cryptographic computation overheads
at the merchant, and exactly the same implementation issues arise for the mer-
chant.
4.2.2 Cost of investment. SET/EMV obviously requires additional in-
vestment for both merchant and consumer.
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Merchant The merchant may need to set up a cryptographic accelerator at
his/her server in order to provide support for peak load transactions,
since the cryptographic mechanisms used in SET/EMV are complex.
Consumer The implementation of SET/EMV requires not only merchants but
also consumers to purchase additional hardware devices. The cardholder
needs to have a smartcard reader installed at their PC.
4.2.3 E-payment infrastructure. The existing e-payment infrastruc-
ture is one of the main barriers to traditional SET implementation. Treese and
Stewart (1998) argue that SET is not compatible with the existing e-payment
infrastructure, since SET prevents merchants from seeing consumer credit card
numbers.
This issue also seems to be a factor that may restrict the implementation of
SET/EMV, as most current e-payment systems require the merchant to access
consumer credit card numbers.
5. SET/EMV IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBILITY
5.1. The FINREAD project
Conducting e-commerce with a combination of SET and EMV is currently
a little complicated for consumers since it requires an additional device (an IC
card reader) to be connected to the user PC. However, a number of smart card
manufacturers are attempting to facilitate the use of smart cards by PC owners.
The emergence of the FINREAD (Financial transactional IC card reader)
project [1] would appear to facilitate SET/EMV implementation, since it is de-
signed to establish a secure smart card reader for use in consumer e-commerce,
including home banking and Internet shopping. Aspects of FINREAD which
are particularly relevant to SET/EMV implementation are as follows.
The FINREAD specifications are designed to support all forms of secure
financial transaction, including SET.
The FINREAD ICC reader will be compatible with the EMV specifica-
tions.
Consumers will be able to purchase smart card readers at low costs with-
out limiting the security and usability of the products.
Hence it is feasible that through FINREAD or by other means the IC card
reader will become a widely adopted PC peripheral.
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5.2. Public/private sector support
In a climate where none of the parties are prepared to commit to the in-
vestment necessary to make SET or SET/EMV a reality, an extra impetus is
required to realise the potentially large benefits from its use. Given potential e-
commerce participants are very concerned about the threat of credit card fraud,
cooperation between the public and private sectors would seem to be a possible
enabler for the future adoption of this alternative scheme. One way in which
the adoption of SET/EMV could be facilitated would be if governments or trade
bodies positively encouraged merchants and card issuers to adopt SET/EMV,
e.g. by requiring its use for their e-business.
Furthermore, since SET and EMV rely on the use of PKI, governments or
trade bodies could also help by enhancing public trust in PKI technologies. As
argued by Tobias [19, p.10], ‘Governments must play a key part in ensuring
that users can trust the technologies that produce secure digital certificates and
the commercial organizations providing it’.
However, for such moves to become reality would require a positive decision
in favour of SET by official bodies, which seems to be some way from reality
in the current climate.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The integration of SET with EMV arguably provides both consumers and
merchants with the highest possible security for the entire online transaction
process. However, serious issues remain that may adversely affect SET/EMV
implementation as they have affected traditional SET. SET/EMV implementa-
tion requires e-commerce end-users to make an investment in the technology,
which they may not be prepared to make. Support from governments and coop-
eration between the public and private sectors is potentially a critical factor in
the possible success of SET/EMV. In addition, the emergence of the FINREAD
project potentially helps the implementation of this integrated technology, since
it was designed to support both SET and EMV in e-commerce transactions.
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Notes
1. http://www.survey.net/shopr.html
2. http://www.visa.com
3. http://www.mastercard.com
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